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#2A-3/2/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I n t h e M a t t e r o f 
JANE E . BERMANN, 
C h a r g i n g P a r t y , 
- : : : - - : - - - : — — — .---- .-—--• - — a n d - --.-—.-- — - —---•-- .- •— ,- :CASE "NO-.- iXfcO 69 9 — -----
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, LOCAL 284, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
JANE E. BERMANN, pro se 
ROBERT PEREZ-WILSON, ESQ. (VIRGINIA HARDY, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Jane E. Bermann (charging party) excepts to the dismissal, 
as deficient, of her improper practice charge against District 
Council 37, Local 284, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (DC 37), which alleges 
that DC 37 violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it advised her that, as a provisional 
employee, no contractual remedy was available to her to protest 
her termination by her employer. The Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissed the 
charge upon the ground that it failed to set forth any 
•i/The charge makes reference to certain conduct by the 
charging party's employer. However, the employer was not 
named as a respondent, nor is there any claim that DC 37 had 
any knowledge of the employer's alleged conduct when it gave 
, charging party the advice giving rise to this charge. 
Board - U-10699 -2 
allegations which, if proven, would constitute a violation of 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act, finding that the mere giving of advice 
that contractual remedies were unavailable to the charging party 
because of her provisional status in no way constitutes a 
vio^tion^of^trhe—Actr —~----— —•-—--------.— —.-———•————-.-—-—--.—r—— - -—._-
We affirm the Director's dismissal of the charge, which 
fails to allege facts which would establish that DC 37 engaged in 
conduct which was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
2/ 
Indeed, there is no claim that the advice given to the charging 
party was not accurate. Under these circumstances, no cognizable 
claim of violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act is made. 
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 2, 1989 
Albany, New York 
.^^4^e^/C A/L 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
fibLAtZ^ X 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
-^/see Local 342, Long Island Public Service Employees 
(MacLean) , 20 PERB [^3045 (1987), conf'd 146 A.D.2d 775, 
(2d Dep't), 22 PERB f7005 (January 30, 1989), mot. for leave 
to appeal den., A.D.2d (June 1989). 
#2B-8/2/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, LOCAL 2190, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK - COLLEGE AT POTSDAM) , 
Respondent. 
PAUL MANKE, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL 
(RICHARD J. DAUTNER, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
United University Professions, Local 2190, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO (UUP) excepts to the denial of its motion to reopen 
an improper practice charge filed by it against the State of 
New York (State University of New York - College at Potsdam) 
(SUNY), which had been withdrawn pursuant to an agreement 
between the parties. The charge alleged a violation of 
§§209-a.l(a), (b) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by SUNY when it required that an 
agreement reached by the parties at a labor-management 
committee meeting concerning a student grade appeal procedure 
be reviewed by the Faculty Assembly, the campus faculty 
governance body. 
In the course of the processing of the charge, the 
Board - U-10086 -2 
parties entered into an agreement as follows: 
1. UUP and the State agree that UUP will be 
notified when appeals are brought at the 
Dean's step of the final grade appeal 
procedure. 
2. UUP and the State will use their best efforts 
- r-.-.: _—_---z:^ -.. --—;-—t o—me e t-as -s o on^as-pors sirb te^-in-;the^Mb o r^^ -^^- -
management committee context to ascertain 
whether any difference of opinion exists as to 
the policy that the Committee worked on for 
approximately one and a half years. 
3. UUP and the State will utilize their best 
efforts to implement as soon as possible a 
uniform, campus-wide policy regarding student 
final grade appeal process. 
4. In light of the above, charge U-10086 is 
hereby withdrawn. The parties agree that the 
above settlement in no way constitutes a 
precedent or an admission in any other 
actions. 
Approximately four months following settlement of the 
charge, UUP made a motion to the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) to reopen 
and litigate the original charge upon the ground that SUNY 
had not met its commitments under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 
settlement agreement. SUNY denies lack of compliance and 
asserts that the intervening summer break between execution 
of the settlement agreement and the motion to reopen 
accounts, in part, for the failure to finalize and implement 
a policy concerning student final grade appeals. 
The Director denied the motion to reopen the charge upon 
the ground that it fails to meet the criteria set forth in 
this Board's decision in New York State Public Employees 
Board - U-10086 
• ' ^ 
Federation (Farkas), 15 PERB 53020 (1982). In that case, we 
allowed the reopening of an improper practice charge upon the 
ground of failure by the respondent to meet the terms of the 
agreement, a failure ascertained on clear, narrow and 
-—--- ""•
 T
-^eoneret^^ 
! comply with the settlement agreement was less than clear, and 
finding that the agreement was subject to a range of 
interpretation by the parties, the Director declined to 
reopen the charge. 
For the reasons which follow, we affirm the Director's 
determination. Although this Board has the authority to 
permit rescission of the withdrawal of an improper practice 
; charge, such discretion should be exercised only in extremely 
rare and limited circumstances, in keeping with the interest 
in finality of settlement agreements. Furthermore, §205.5(d) 
of the Act instructs us that we are without authority "to 
enforce an agreement between an employer and an employee 
organization and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an 
alleged violation of such an agreement that would not 
otherwise constitute an improper employer or employee 
organization practice." In construing this statutory 
limitation, we have repeatedly held that an improper practice 
charge seeking merely to enforce an agreement between the 
parties is beyond our jurisdiction, whereas an alleged 
repudiation of an agreement does fall within our improper 
! ; 
Board - U-10086 -4 
practice jurisdiction. Thus, the Board has held it has 
jurisdiction over a charge alleging repudiation of an 
agreement where the respondent denies the existence of an 
agreement or its contractual obligation under circumstances 
" --•-— -demoTrst^atiTig-n^ —:---.—----=-
In our view, settlement agreements reached between the 
parties in resolution of improper practice charges should not 
be set aside and the charges reopened except in the same 
extraordinary circumstances which would establish a 
repudiation of the settlement agreement, as we have defined 
repudiation in our review of our analysis of our jurisdiction 
under §2 05.5(d) of the Act. As we suggested in Farkas, a 
mere difference between the parties in interpretation of a 
settlement agreement or a difference of opinion concerning 
the extent to which compliance has been achieved is 
insufficient to warrant the reopening of a settled improper 
practice charge. It is only under circumstances in which 
there is no colorable claim of compliance with the settlement 
agreement or in which it can be shown that the noncomplying 
party has otherwise repudiated the agreement that a charge 
will be reopened. A difference of opinion concerning 
whether, and the extent to which, compliance with a 
settlement agreement has taken place is a matter for 
enforcement procedures in another forum. 
i i/see Connetquot Central School District, 21 PERB f3 049 
(1988) ; City of Buffalo, 19 PERB «|[3023 (1986) ; Honeove CSD. 
18 PERB ?[3085 (1985) . 
Board - U-10086 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Director's denial of UUP's 
application to reopen Case No. U-10086 is affirmed, and the 
application is hereby denied in its entirety. 
•"BATED-:- -August 2 > -19^ 89-
Albany, New York 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
LAJLACZ-. T. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
//2C-8/2/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF KENMORE, 
CASE NO. E-1462 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
FLAHERTY, COHEN, GRANDE, RANDAZZO & DOREN, P.C. 
(DENNIS J. CAMPAGNA, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Village of Kenmore 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY, ESQS. (W. JAMES 
SCHWAN, ESQ., of Counsel), for Kenmore Club, Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Village of Kenmore (Village) excepts to the 
dismissal by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) of its application for the 
designation of three Captains in its Police Department as 
managerial. The Captains are currently represented by the 
Kenmore Club, Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
(Association) in a unit consisting of the uniformed personnel 
of the Department, excluding the Chief, Deputy Chiefs and 
civilians. Ultimate responsibility for the operation of the 
Police Department rests with the Village's Board of Trustees 
and Mayor. The Chief is the Village's designee for the 
operation of the Police Department. Below him in the chain 
of command are two Deputy Chiefs, who are responsible, 
Board - E-1462 2 
respectively, for supervision of the Department's patrol 
duties and for administration. The three Captains who are 
the subject of this application report to the Deputy Chief in 
charge of patrol duties, and each is responsible for 
supervision of one^o f 7the~rthree sh if t s op era/ted fry^the " ~ 
Department. Four Lieutenants report to the Captains, who, in 
turn, supervise a total of 14 Patrol Officers. 
The Director found that although the record abundantly 
establishes that the Captains perform a supervisory function 
within the Village's Police Department, the discretion 
afforded to the Captains in the exercise of their supervisory 
roles is sufficiently circumscribed by contract and 
Department policy to warrant denial of the application to 
designate the Captains as managerial. 
Section 2 01.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) authorizes this Board to designate 
persons as managerial: 
only if they are persons (i) who 
formulate policy or (ii) who may 
reasonably be required on behalf of the 
public employer to assist directly in the 
preparation for and conduct of collective 
negotiations or to have a major role in 
the administration of agreements or in 
personnel administration provided that 
such role is not of a routine or clerical 
nature and requires the exercise of 
independent judgment. 
Notwithstanding the Village's exceptions, we affirm the 
Director's finding that the involvement of the Captains in 
Board - E-1462 
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personnel administration does not warrant a managerial 
designation. The facts that the Captains have some 
responsibility for contract and disciplinary matters at the 
lower levels of the procedures, and that Captains may, on 
^ccasxon^ ^ recommend dTsci^l^ 
requisite criteria of establishing the existence of a "major" 
role in personnel administration or administration of 
agreements, or that such role requires the exercise of 
independent judgment not circumscribed by Village policy and 
contract. The Director's decision is accordingly affirmed 
in this regard. 
We also affirm the Director's determination that the 
Captains do not presently "formulate policy". While the 
Captains may, on occasion, make recommendations concerning 
policy based upon their supervisory responsibilities, the 
record fails to establish that the Captains have any 
authority to determine what policies will be followed within 
the Department. 
Finally, we turn to the portion of the Village's 
exceptions which relate to its claim that "The future plans 
of the Police Department include meaningful participation in 
•^/Hempstead Public Schools. 6 PERB ^3001 (1973) , conf'd sub 
nom. Board of Education v. Helsby, 42 A.D. 2d 1056, 6 PERB 
1[7012 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd, 35 N.Y. 2d 877, 7 PERB f7024 
(1974) . 
^/Cf. McGraw CSD, 21 PERB 53001 (1988). 
Board - E-1462 
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policy development and reformulation and meaningful 
participation in future negotiations." In this regard, the 
Village points to testimony by the Chief that he has assigned 
to the Captains some of the responsibility for the redrafting 
"~
:
"
:
-~~oif^ the"Dep"a"-rtiffie"Mt lTs^  poliey^manual^:~ EveTi assuming~that th:is:~ ~ 
assignment constitutes a current and not a future activity 
(as required by the Act), this testimony does not establish 
that the Captains have or will have a significant role in the 
formulation of new policy or that they do or will formulate 
new policy themselves. Rather, the evidence indicates that 
the policy manual requires updating simply because it no 
longer conforms to actual practice within the Department, and 
that corrections are needed to properly identify the persons 
and/or ranks of persons having various responsibilities 
within the Department. There is no indication that the 
Captains have been given, or will be given, responsibility 
for preparation or issuance of a policy manual which departs 
in any material fashion from current practice, nor is there 
any indication in the record that any rewrite of the policy 
manual in which they will participate will constitute 
anything other than recommendations or suggestions for 
change. Indeed, the Chief testified that, following certain 
staffing and structural changes within the Department, the 
Department's rules and regulations were made "archaic" and 
Board - E-1462 
"not appropriate in all situations". Accordingly, the Chief 
testified: 
It has been my intention for some time to revise 
it, to modernize it, to update it, etc. but I don't 
have the time to do it all by myself, nor do I have 
the staff . . . and I think that it requires 
~
 :
~ ~ ~"^ ~^  - ^ 
Department as primary enforcement officers; namely, 
Police Officers, Lieutenants and Captains. 
While the Chief indicated his intention to rely primarily 
upon the Captains for this task, he also made it clear that 
input at all levels will be sought. Under these 
circumstances, the Chief's intention to primarily utilize 
Captains for the rewrite of the Department's policy manual 
does not rise to the level of policy formulation necessary to 
y
 obtain a managerial designation under the Act. 
Similarly, we reject the Village's contention that the 
future use of the Captains in collective negotiations 
warrants their designation as managerial. The record does 
not disclose anything more than an intention by the Village 
to solicit suggestions and recommendations from the Captains, 
among others, concerning additions to or deletions from the 
collective bargaining agreement with the Association. There 
is no indication in the record that Captains will either 
participate directly in collective negotiations or that they 
will have any significant behind-the-scenes involvement in 
Board - E-1462 
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the negotiation process such as to warrant a managerial 
designation. -2/ 
Based upon the foregoing, the Director's dismissal of 
the instant application is affirmed, and IT IS ORDERED that 
the --application loef-anciF i-t-hereb^^ 
entirety. 
DATED: August 2, 1989 
Albany, New York 
%z&ue ^ 4L< yo^o-T^jt. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member / 
•2/see, Newburgh Enlarged CSD, 21 PERB ^3047 (1988) and cases 
cited therein. 
//2D-8/2/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
—-—r——------ -— ----- ------ - ^tftxoner, " ~T .———.—-- ----: -.-. -------
- and - CASE NO. C-3275 
STATE OF NEW YORK (LONG ISLAND PARK, 
RECREATION, AND HISTORICAL PRESERVATION 
COMMISSION), 
Employer, 
- and -
NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
FREDERICK J. PFEIFER, ESQ., for Petitioner 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD J. 
DAUTNER, ESQ., of Counsel), for Employer 
ROWLEY, FORREST, O'DONNELL & HITE, P.C. (BRIAN O'DONNELL, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the New 
York County and Municipal Employees, District Council 66, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 66) to the dismissal by the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
of its petition seeking to represent lifeguard titles of the 
State of New York (State) Long Island State Park, Recreation, 
^ 
Board - C-3275 
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and Historical Preservation Commission (Commission). The 
petition seeks fragmentation of the Commission's lifeguard 
titles from the Security Services Unit (Unit), which is 
represented by the New York State Inspection, Security and 
~
 r
 —•" -Eaw^ En^ orc«ffieT!trrEm 
CIO (Council 82). While the State opposes fragmentation of 
these titles, Council 82 supports the petition. 
The Commission's lifeguards constitute approximately 57% 
of all lifeguards in the existing unit, approximately 25% of 
all seasonals in the unit and less than 2% of all employees 
in the unit. They are employed at the State's beaches 
located on Long Island, and thus perform lifeguard duty at 
y ocean sites rather than at the lake sites where all other 
unit lifeguard personnel are employed. 
The Director dismissed the petition upon the ground that 
Council 66 failed to establish the existence of the 
compelling evidence required by our decisions to warrant 
fragmentation of a long-standing bargaining unit. In its 
exceptions, Council 66 argues, in the alternative, that the 
Board's standard for fragmentation of long-standing units 
should be reconsidered and lowered, or that the standard has 
in any event been met in the instant case. 
This Board has long adhered to two ruling principles in 
deciding uniting questions. First, we have held that "[i]t 
is the policy of the Act to find appropriate the largest unit 
Board - C-3275 -3 
permitting for effective negotiations" .-3=/ The second long-
standing principle to which we have adhered is that 
fragmentation of existing bargaining units will not be 
granted in the absence of compelling evidence of the need to 
established by proving the existence of a conflict of 
interest or inadequate representation. 
3/ 
When these 
principles have been applied in the creation and continuation 
of appropriate units, they have, at the very least, 
contributed to stability in public sector labor relations and 
have focused the parties * attention on substantive 
negotiations rather than on the process of adding to or 
subtracting from units. Notwithstanding the arguments of 
Council 66, we shall adhere to our standards for review of 
fragmentation petitions. 
Having so concluded, we now turn to the question whether 
the Director properly applied these principles to the facts 
of the instant case. It is our determination that he did and 
that the Director's decision should be affirmed. 
•i/see County of Ulster, 22 PERB 13030, at 3073 (1989), 
quoting from Town of North Castle, 19 PERB 54049, at 4071 (1986). 
^/see, e.g., Deer Park UFSD. 22 PERB 53014 (1989); State 
of New York, 21 PERB 53050 (1988); Chautauqua County BOCES, 
15 PERB 53126 (1982). 
) 
1/ld. 
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Council 6 6 argues, first, that Commission lifeguards are 
subject to significantly more hazardous working conditions 
than unit lifeguards who are employed at lake sites. While 
there is no dispute that ocean lifeguards are subjected to 
-:r=^r -gYelftTer^rUl3T^~iTr^ 
said that the difference in risk level is any greater than 
the difference in risk level among other groups within the 
unit. For example, correction officers having direct contact 
with inmates (working in population) in maximum security 
inmate facilities may be subjected to a considerably greater 
risk than correction officers performing administrative 
duties. This does not, however, warrant fragmentation of the 
occupational category of correction officer any more than 
fragmentation of the occupational category of lifeguard. 
Notwithstanding the increase in risk, the Commission 
lifeguards continue to share a community of interest at least 
with other lifeguards in the unit, as well as with other 
seasonal employees within the unit, which is not outweighed 
by the increased hazard of ocean duty. 
Council 66 argues, next, that the longevity, degree of 
interest in bargaining, and esprit de corps of the Commission 
lifeguards sufficiently distinguish them from other 
lifeguards, other seasonals, and other employees in the 
Security Services Unit to warrant their fragmentation. As 
pointed out by the Director, however, the existence of a 
Board - C-3275 -5 
sense of cohesiveness among unit members, or the absence of 
such a sense, does not constitute a proper basis upon which 
uniting decisions should be made. To do so would result in 
the proliferation of units by title, by work site, possibly 
" ~ ~ ""' ^hy shift; ^and1^ even within - sp eci f ic worlc ~sa t e!T,~^hrP would: b e " -^  
contrary to the principles by which we have been guided in 
carrying out our uniting responsibilities under the Act. 
Based upon the detailed factual findings and analysis set 
forth in the Director's decision, therefore, we deny the 
exceptions of Council 66 in this regard. 
The primary assertion made by Council 66 in support of 
fragmentation of the Commission lifeguards from the Security 
J Services Unit is that they have been largely ignored as a 
constituency in the collective negotiating process. In this 
regard, it must be noted that, while the Commission 
lifeguards are clearly in the forefront among seasonals and 
lifeguards generally in formulating and pursuing negotiating 
demands, the demands which have been pursued are not of 
unique interest to Commission lifeguards. Indeed, the two 
primary negotiating goals expressed by the Commission 
lifeguards relate to the establishment of third-party 
disciplinary procedures and seniority, subjects which are, 
although less consistently expressed, certainly of interest 
to other lifeguards and seasonals throughout the unit. The 
nature of these demands does not, therefore, establish the 
Board - C-3275 
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existence of any conflict of interest with other seasonals or 
lifeguards within the unit. Council 66 further asserts, 
however, that the fact that full-time employees in the unit 
already have the benefit of third-party disciplinary 
^roce^ures^aiidr sehxority ri^htlrrgi^esr 
interest with those in the unit who do not now possess those 
benefits. We disagree. There can be no claim that 
Council 82, which represents both full-time and seasonal 
employees in the Security Services Unit, does not share the 
view that these benefits are of significant value. The only 
issue which exists is whether these benefits are or have been 
realistically achievable for seasonal employees, lifeguards 
generally, or Commission lifeguards in particular. We, thus, 
reach the final question before us in our consideration of 
this case, which is whether the disparity in level of 
benefits of the petitioned-for employees, compared to full-
time unit employees evidences either a conflict of interest 
between the groups, or establishes a history of inadequate 
representation arising to a level warranting fragmentation. 
It is our determination that the testimony of 
Council 82's chief negotiator establishes neither the type of 
systematic and intentional disregard of the interests of the 
petitioned-for group, nor the neglect or indifference to the 
interests of the group which would warrant the fragmentation 
sought. Instead, we find that the negotiating history 
Board - C-3275 -7 
described by Council 82's chief negotiator establishes that 
efforts have been made to accommodate the interests and 
negotiating needs of seasonal employees generally and the 
Commission lifeguards in particular and that, to the extent 
—-• -----—------i-TTzzyya^T^^ - - - - - - - - - - - ^ = 1 — 
Council 82"s failure to achieve the goals sought by the 
Commission lifeguards reflects the realities of the 
collective negotiation process. Council 82's chief 
negotiator testified that the interests of a minority of the 
bargaining unit must sometimes be subordinated to the 
interests of the majority and the need to come to closure in 
the negotiating process. We construe this testimony as an 
expression of nothing more than an acknowledgement of the 
reality that, in the bargaining process, it is simply not 
possible to satisfy all subgroups all of the time. We need 
not decide, therefore, whether the unit would be fragmented 
if the record evidenced a policy or intention of routinely 
disregarding the interests of this particular subgroup out of 
hand. 
Based upon the foregoing, and upon the findings and 
analysis contained in the Director's decision, we find that 
Council 66 has failed to meet its burden of establishing the 
existence of a conflict of interest or inadequate 
representation sufficient to warrant fragmentation of 
Commission lifeguards from the existing unit represented by 
Board - C-3275 -8 
Council 82. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 2, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^ S ^ / P / ^ -€^0~-^P^L 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member f 
#2E-8/2/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the Impasse Between 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
-and-
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, DIVISION 726. 
CERTIFICATION 
CASE NO. TIA89-19: 
M88-238 
In accordance with the provisions of §209.5(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and based upon an 
investigation conducted under §2 05.15 of the Board's Rules of 
Procedure into the status of the above entitled impasse, it 
is hereby certified that a voluntary resolution of the 
contract negotiations between the New York City Transit 
Authority and the Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 726 
cannot be effected. The dispute between the parties is 
accordingly referred to the Public Arbitration Panel 
designated in accordance with the provisions of §209.5(a) of 
the Act and §2 05.18 of this Board's Rules of Procedure. 
Dated: August 2, 1989 
Albany, New York 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
CAA^UC^. X' &-*> 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
//3A-8/2/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3490 
MANHATTAN AND BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT 
OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Transit Supervisors 
Organization has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All those in the position of Assistant Field 
Manager and Assistant Field Supervisor. 
Certification - C-3490 page 2 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Transit Supervisors 
Organization. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
^utSral^bl~ig^tron^1^^ 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 2, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Acu^^M £ A(Z< 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
»x_ ZL-
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3B-8/2/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WEBSTER CENTRAL SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS 
COALITION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3505 
WEBSTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
AFSCHE, NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, LOCAL 1635-D, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that AFSCME, New York Council 66, 
Local 1635-D, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
' ^ 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All those in the position of Head Mechanic, 
Mechanic I, Mechanic II, Bus Driver and 
Courier. 
Excluded:—fill seasonal employees and all other employees" 
of the District. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with AFSCME, New York Council 66, 
Local 1635-D, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: August 2, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^C^€u./L 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
//3C-8/2/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
===^ ==^ --=and--- ~- :-—--z=rz= =cRSB^N0^C-35igF^ --=--=— 
ROOSEVELT ISLAND OPERATING CORP., 
Employer, 
-and-
ALLIED INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3519 
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Unit: Included: Uniformed Security Officers, Sergeants and 
Dispatchers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 2, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
#4A-8/2/89 
S T A T E OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
5 0 WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12205-2670 
(518) 457-2614 
August 2, 1989 . 
Miguel Ortiz, Esq. 
.Assistant Counsel 
Mimi C. Satter, Esq. 
Baker, Clark & Satter 
Civil Service "Employees Assh^ 
143 Washington Avenue 
Albany, NY 12224 
Christopher H. Gardner, Esq. 
Council 82, AFSCME 
61 Colvin Avenue 
Albany, NY 12206 
1104 State~"'Tbwer~BuiTdiTTg" 
Syracuse, NY 13202 
Earle E. Thurston, Esq. 
Corporation Counsel 
City of Auburn 
One Lincoln Street 
Auburn, NY 13 021 
Re: Case Nos. U-10232, U-10251 & U-10295 
Dear Counsel: 
As you know, the Administrative Law Judge (ALT) decision 
in the above referenced matters, issued on April 3, 1989, 
relied, heavily upon the Board Decision in Board of Education 
of the City School District of the City of New York, 19 PERB 
53015 (1986), aff'd. sub nom. Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York v. PERB, 21 PERB 
57001 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1988) in reaching the conclusion 
that §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
had been violated. Subsequent to issuance of the ALT 
decision and to the filing of briefs and exceptions in this 
matter, the Appellate Division, Third Department, in a 
decision dated June 1, 1989, unanimously reversed the Supreme 
Court and PERB. A copy of that decision is attached for your 
information. 
There is now pending before the New York State Court of 
Appeals a motion for leave to appeal the Appellate Division 
decision and order. 
I am writing to you for the purpose of informing you 
that the Board has decided to await the outcome at least of 
the motion for leave to appeal before issuing a decision in 
the above referenced matter. We will inform you of the 
outcome of the motion as soon as we have received it, and, at 
that time, the Board would be prepared to entertain a request 
for supplemental argument, taking into account the outcome of 
-2-
the New York City Board of Education case. 
In the event that any party has any objection to the 
foregoing procedure, please advise immediately. 
Very truly yours, 
Deputy Chairman & Counsel 
PRK/mn 
Enclosure ' 
cc: Harold R. Newman 
Walter L. Eisenberg 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK; and NATHAN QUINONES, 
Chancellor of the City School District 
of the City of New York, 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
-against-
THE NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS BOARD; HAROLD R. NEWMAN, 
Chairman; WALTER L. EISENBERG, Member; 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, Local 2 , 
j •_: AFT, AFL-CIO;,COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS • _ _ 
D^"M?SOTisTi®T6^ ';'""-ir6cai" r; ~AFSAV '~L^~ = _ --——-^ —-^ .•——:-^ -__^ =^7 
AFL-CIO; INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 
OPERATING ENGINEERS, Local 891; 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME; and 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondents-Respondents. 
Case Nos. U-7776, U-7864, U-7868, U-7943, U-7937 
Before: New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
Third Department; June 1, 1989 
Back references: 21 PERB 7001; 19 PERB 3026, 3015, .4532, 
4503; 18 PERB 4625, 4624, 4621 
Peter L. Zimroth, Corporation Counsel, City of New York 
(David D. Karnovskv of counsel), for petitioners-appellants. 
Margin L. Barr (Jerome Thier of counsel) , for respondent 
Public Employment Relations Board. 
James R. Sandner (J. Christopher Meagher of counsel) , for 
respondent United Federation of Teachers. 
Bruce K. Bryant, for respondent Council of Supervisors and 
Administrators. 
Cohn, Glickstein & Lurie and Spivak, Lipton, Watanabe & 
Spivak (Stephen L. Fine of counsel), for respondents 
International Union of Operating Engineers and Communications 
Workers of America. 
Robert Perez-Wilson fRosaria R. Esperon of counsel), for 
respondent District Council 37. 
Oapt-iEHiHrbirrul Bi-'pai1 latent 
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HARVEY, J.! 
In the wake of a 1904 scandal concerning alleged financial 
improprieties and breaches of public trust involving a former 
Chancellor of the City School District of the City of Hew York, 
petitioner Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of Mew York (hereinafter the Board) took steps to ensure that 
no similar incidents would occur in the future by undertaking to 
~- ~• -"-""rnvePs"tigate~i ts^norrt-e nu-r-e-d—e-npl-oy-ee\s^e^.-lTr^^oM-ng3zri-:trS:T^au-feb-o-r-ity—una[-&-&•-_—.---_-_._.-_. 
Education Law § 2590-g (13) and (14), the Board adopted Chancellor's 
Regulations C-115 and C-120, as amended, which basically required 
designated Board employees earning certain wages to undergo 
background investigations and submit detailed annual financial 
disclosure statements as a condition of their continued employment. 
Four of the respondents in this proceeding, employee organizations 
representing various units of the Board's employees, filed improper 
employer practice charges with respondent Public Employment 
Relations Board (hereinafter .PERB) claiming that the Board's 
unilateral adoption of regulations C-115 and C-120 and its refusal 
, to negotiate the matter violated Civil Service Law § 209-a (1) (d) 
and (o). The matters were heard separately and the Administrative 
Lav; Judges found for said respondents. In all the matters.,_ the 
Board was ordered to rescind and cease enforcement of•the disputed 
regulations. 
Thereafter, the Board filed exceptions to the: administrative 
decisions with PERB. In a consolidated decision, PERB determined 
that the Board's actions violated the Taylor Lav; and ordered the 
Board to rescind and cease enforcement of the regulations. The 
Board and its Chancellor then commenced this CPLR article 78 
proceeding seeking to set aside and annul PERB's determination. 
Supreme Court, dismissed the petition on the merits and this appeal 
by petitioners ensued. 
As the agency charged with implementing the Taylor Law {Civil 
Service Law §5 200-214), PERB "is presumed to have developed an 
expertise which requires [courts] to accept its construction.of [the 
Taylor Lav;]" unless the determination is arbitrary and capricious or 
an abuse of discretion (natter of Town of Mamaroneck PBA v Hew York 
State Pub; Employment Relations Bd., 66 NY2d 7 22, 724; see, Hatter 
of West Irondeguoit Teachers Assn. v Helsby, 35 NY2d 46, 51). In 
the present case, petitioners argue that the pivotal issue raised 
herein requires an interpretation of the Education Law, not the 
Taylor Lav;, and therefore PERB's determination that the imposition 
of financial disclosure and background investigation requirements 
are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining is not entitled to 
the deference accorded such decisions (see, flatter o_f Town of 
' llamaroneck PBA v Mew York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd,, •. 
a^^ ^^ -tftmairiai'-jjrjjarftmici ^  
supra, at 724). The principal statute at issue is Education Lav; S 
2590-g/ which provides in pertinent part that: 
[T]he city board shall have power and duty to: 
* * * 
14. a. Prescribe regulations and bylaws requiring 
members^ ^ of__the_j:ity__b_oard,f the chancellor and, for ; i_ 
good cause shown, any other officer or employee" In"" 
schools and programs under the jurisdiction of the 
city board and the chancellor, to submit to the 
city board, in the discretion of the city board, 
financial reports for themselves and their spouses. 
b. The frequency and period of coverage, the 
designation of persons to submit such reports b y -
name,- title or income level or by a combination 
thereof, and the content of such reports, 
including minimum dollar amounts, shall be 
determined by the city, board and s.uch reports may 
include but not necessarily be limited to the T 
following * * * (emphasis supplied). 
However, despite petitioners' contentions otherwise, this case does 
turn on PERB's interpretation of the Taylor Law and not on any 
interpretation by PER3 of the Education Law. As revealed by the 
record, both PERB and petitioners are in agreement that the 
financial disclosure requirements of Education Law § 2590-g (14) are 
discretionary since petitioners have apparently abandoned any 
argument that financial disclosure requirements were mandated by. the 
Education Law. Such an argument could not be persuasive since 
Education Lav; § 2590-g (14) was added to the statute in 1975 and 
petitioners* regulations were not adopted until 1984. Accordingly, 
this case turns on whether the imposition of financial disclosure 
requirements are terms and conditions of employment which are 
mandatory subjects for collective bargaining' (see. Civil Service Lav; 
5 204 [23; § 209-a [1] [d]) and whether PERB's determination that 
they were should' be'accorded deference. 
In our view, PERB's determination should be annulled. While 
PERB is usually given discretion in determining what issues, 
constitute mandatory subjects for collective bargaining, there are 
exceptions where certain matters otherwise deemed terms and 
conditions of employment are prohibited from collective bargaining. 
This is where there is "plain and clear" language against it in a 
statute (Syracuse Teachers Assn. v Board of Eriuc., Syracuse City 
School Dist., 35 UY2d 743, 744) or where there is a public policy 
explicitly or implicitly prohibiting collective bargaining derived 
from a statute or statutory scheme "(natter of Susquehanna Val* Cent. 
Si?tr^-3te&iTml-©rpttt4ttH^—— 
- ^ ^aoaa 
School Dist. at Conklin [Susquehanna Val. Teachers' Assn. 3, 37 HY2d 
614, 616-617). 
Here, we find an example of the latter exception (see, Hatter 
of Cohoes City School Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 NY2d 7 74, 
778). While Education Law § 2590-g (14) and the various other 
provisions in the Education Law permitting the imposition of 
f i n a n cji a ^ jdisclosure _rej^ ujirementsof_;_ce.r_tain employees—•(-ge^ -,--e;2j^ r/^ —;;---•-—---
Educ^ atio'n1 Law §" 2590-e [2 0T;5 2590-g [13] jdo"not explicitly forbid 
collective bargaining as to this subject, it is our view that this 
prohibition is- implicit in such provisions (see, id.; see also, 
3oard of Educ., Great Neck Union Free School Dist. v Areman, 41 NY2d 
527, 534). Undeniably, there is a strong public policy to detect 
and deter corruption and conflict of interest. The Second circuit 
Court of Appeals has held such policy to be a substantial, possibly 
even a compelling, state interest (see, Barry v City of New York, 
712 F2d 1554, 156.0, cert denied 464 US 1017; see also, Kaplan v 
Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 759 F2d 256, 
2 61-26 2; Matter of Levitt v Board of Collective Bargaining of City 
of LY., 140 nisc 2d 727). 
In reaching its determination that financial disclosure 
requirements are mandated subjects of collective bargaining, PERB 
applied a balancing test in which it weighed the State's interest in 
deterring and detecting corruption against the privacy interests of 
the employees. Factoring in also the public policy of encouraging 
collective bargaining, PERB concluded that the privacy rights of the 
affected employees outweighed the public interest in avoiding 
corruption. We find this oversimplified analysis inadequate as it 
appears to pay insufficient, attention "to the fact that the public 
interest in.avoiding, corruption .* * * is of enormous importance to 
government in carrying out its core concerns" (Matter of Levitt v 
Board of Collective Bargaining of City of N.Y., supra, at 738). 
PERB apparently disregarded numerous decisions in this area which 
have held that whatever constitutionally protected privacy interests 
may be affected by the disclosure requirements are outweighed by the 
governmental interest in avoiding corruption and conflicts of 
interest (see, Kaplan v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of 'City 
of N.Y., supra; Barry v City of New York, supra; Evans v Carey, 4 0 
HY2d 1008; Hunter v City of New York, 58 AD2d 136, affd 44 NY2d 
708). The case of Rapp v Carey (44 NY2d 157), relied on by 
respondents, is inapposite since it holds that employees' privacy 
rights are not overborne by unlawfully passed executive orders. 
Here, the Board's regulations are derived from implicit and explicit 
statutory direction. 
In sum, we find that, in light of the strong public interest in 
detecting and deterring corruption, the imposition of financial 
disclosure requirements is a prohibited subject of collective 
••gfytf^ -ik&fflttl Bryartmeitl—* 
, j « , & j 
-saoaa. 
bargaining. It would be absurd to require the Board here to 
negotiate over anticorruption measures with the very employees who 
honesty and integrity are at issue. In light of our finding that 
PERD's determination should be annulled, we find it unnecessary to 
address the- remaining issues raised by petitioners. 
=Opi hxorr byT FjkRVEYr^7:: i fv Wh£clT^ f^eSEY
 r^73>7 7^ I^KOI^^fekWlCH 
^R., and I^ feRCURE, J J.7 concur. 
Judgment reversed, on the law, with costs, determination 
annulled and petition granted. 
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